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ABSTRACT 
REMAPPING CRITICAL THINKING THEORY: 
A CRITIQUE OF RICHARD PAUL'S MODEL OF CRITICAL THINKING 
May 1998 
Lyonel Prime, B.A., University of Massachusetts Boston 
M.A. University of Massachusetts Boston 
Directed by Professor Delores Gallo 
This project is a critical examination of Richard Paul's theoretical 
conceptualization of critical thinking. In his relentless criticism of the didactic 
approach characterizing current academic instruction, Paul develops a model of critical 
thinking that he refers to as critical thinking in the strong sense . The model posits 
dialogue as the methodological strategy that helps overcome egocentric and socio-
centric thinking and thereby facilitates the achievement of ethically rational 
development. By egocentric and sociocentric thinking , Paul means the thinking that is 
bound, respectivel y, by one 's point of view and social context. The model in question 
is intended not only to displace didactic instruction but also to transcend the 
overemphasis on logic that characterizes current critical thinking theorizing. 
While Paul's work points to a promising theoretical horiwn, it betrays the very 
educational ideal that it sets out to pursue. Not only is it the exemplification of the 
didactic approach that it is intended to displace, but it is also carried out in a 
conceptual framework that reinforces the modernist view of effective thinking as the 
rigorous application of rational standards in the determination of the truthfulness of 
issues. By giving preeminence to logic and rational standards in the thinking process, 
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Paul's view legitimizes a style of inquiry that is conducive to definitive closure. It is 
fundamentally reductionist: it tends to privilege exclusion over integration, object over 
relationship. 
This paper presents an alternative view of critical thinking the theoretical 
underpinning of which includes a conception of knowledge as immanent. Its primary 
concern is the achievement of understanding or the production of meaning through 
persistent explorations of relational structures as opposed to discrete objects. It 
therefore dismisses any quest for a secure foundation of knowing as illusory. 
This work is presenting as its starting point the conventional model of 
educational practice. It provides a brief description of the didactic approach against 
which Paul levels his criticism. Then, it moves to offer Paul's actual criticism, his 
view of critical thinking and a critique of his model. Finally, the paper presents a 
reconfiguration of the theoretical landscape of critical thinking. It formulates and 
justifies a non-objectivist conception of critical thinking. 
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The last two decades have witnessed an explosion of concerns about the critical 
state of the American educational system. The yawning chasm between academic 
outcomes and institutional expectation has been a very troubling phenomenon. In the 
view of many responsible educators and critics, the situation has reached an intolerable 
threshold. Students' performance levels not only have been falling far below specified 
standards, they are al so dee Ii n i ng at an alarming rate. The challenge that teachers are 
facing involves a waning interest in intellectual issues among a relatively large 
segment of the student population . and the latter's inability to retrieve insights 
contained in instructional materials and to articulate an argumentative position 
cogently . Attempts have been made to curb the crisis , but no significant results have 
been recorded so far. The trend continues its course, notwithstanding the plethora of 
reform strategies implemented by school authorities. 
The threat of this undesirable state of affairs has led to the emergence of the 
so-called critical thinking movement of which Richard Paul is viewed as one of the 
leading representatives . Regardless of the varying tendencies characterizing the 
movement. the conviction shared by all the advocates is that the main source of the 
educational crisis is to be sought in the structure of the conventional pedagogical 
model, not in some isolated manifestations thereof. On their view, the traditional 
model of educational practice is based on a conception of knowledge, learning and 
teaching that inhibits the very developmental process that it is supposedly designed to 
promote . They argue that by dealing with knowledge as a set of fixed entities pre-
determined by competent authorities, the model reduces learning and teaching to a 
unidirectional, stulfying process of transmission and reception . The correct response to 
the problem , as they perceive it. is the restructuring of the educational process which 
involves a radical departure from the didactic practice of teaching and the creation of 
the pedagogical space that would truly help the learner actualize her full potential. 
The infusion of creative and critical thinking in school curricula is proposed as a 
potent educational strategy by means of which the displacement of the didactic 
approach can be effected and the alleged pedagogical space created. 
Richard Paul whose work constitutes the object of the critical study undertaken 
here is a staunch advocate of educational change through critical thinking instruction . 
He develops a critical thinking model which calls for the active participation of the 
learner in the production of knowledge. Dialogue is posited as the methodological 
context within which participants become aware of the limitations of their views and 
develop critical thinking competencies. Dialogue, as Paul sees it, turns learning into a 
collective process of inquiry and enables participants not only to recognize the 
multidimensional character of issues but also to examine them from a multilogical 
perspective. In Paul's critical thinking theorizing, the task of critical thinking 
instruction involves more than the achievement of intellectual ability; it includes the 
development of intellectual character as well. Put differently, the goal of critical 
thinking instruction is to produce rational thinkers who are ethically committed. The 
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integration of this ethical dimension in the conceptualization of critical thinking 
contributes to the articulation of a model to which Paul refers as strong-sense critical 
thinking. The strong-sense critical thinking model is laid forth by Paul as a departure 
from the conventional logicist orientation and as the conceptual framework that is 
conducive to the cultivation and achievement of genuine critical fair-mindedness. 
The present study purports to produce a critique of Paul' theoretical 
conceptualization of critical thinking. It shows that despite its penetrating insights, 
Paul's theoretical mode I vitiates its own possibility's by instantiating the very didactic 
approach that it sets out to displace. It also points out that, to a significant extent, 
Paul's immersion into his lectorial mode of articulation turns his model into a 
concatenation of unsubstantiated theoretical claims. Knowing is posited as a 
constructive process. but no delineation of the underlying epistemological principles is 
provided. Creative thinking is treated as a marginal concern and therefore enjoys no 
real analytical space in the theoretical configuration. Furthermore, there is very little. 
if any , specification of the model of rationality with which Paul operates. Paul's 
argument integrates an interpretation of rationality which seems to vacillate between 
transcendental and hermeneutic conceptions. These are the issues that the study 
wishes to address in the ensuing pages. 
An essential part of the critical study's purpose is to attempt to lay the 
groundwork for a more promising theoretical perspective. It seeks to do so by 
engaging in a mode of theorizing that liberates thinking from the tyrannical strong-
hold of objectivist epistemology including the rational quest for certainty , foundation, 
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and essence that it entails. The jettisoning of objectivist thinking and the espousal of a 
hermeneutic conception of inquiry contribute to make critical thinking a genuinely 
constructive. open-ended. integrative or multi-perspectival process of cognition. It is 
important to clarify at the outset that while we recognize the displacement of 
objectivism as a necessary step toward the development of effective thinking , we do 
not wish, however. to construe thinking exclusively in epistemological terms. There is 
a whole political dimension including its feminist ramification that is at issue in the 
articulation of an emancipatory perspective. Indeed, the very shift in thinking 
recommended in this project is. in itself, a political issue. There is a tremendous 
amount of institutional power invested in the politics of knowledge that we are 
interrogating. So by excluding the political aspect, we are not, by any means, trying 
to sidestep its significance. We simply put it into abeyance for two important reasons: 
analyses of the political dimension involved in critical thinking are already being 
carried out to adequate depth by such critical pedagogy theorists as Henry A. Giroux. 
Regina Ketch. Stanley Aronowitz to cite but these few. The attention that is being 
given to the epistemological component is less substantial in our judgment. The other 
reason is that we want to keep the project to a manageable scope in order to deal 
successfully with the time constraint within which its realization is expected. 
The project derives its ideational matrix from a variety of philosophical 
sources. The theory of discourse which helps shape the foundational concepts of the 
thesis is heavily influenced by the works of such post-modernist thinkers as Michel 
Foucault, Ernesto Laclau and Jacques Derrida. It embraces the whole of Laclau's view 
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of discourse and rejects Foucault 's distinction between discursive and non-discursive 
practices. The perspective presented in this paper eschews the idea of there being 
non-discursive institutional practices . In addition , much of Derrida's deconstructive 
enterprise is in consonance with the project's anti-metaphysical stance. However, we 
part company with the author at some point where his seemingly cognitively 
responsible theoretical analysi s turns into an exercise in intellectual nihilism. 
Furthermore. the post-modern episteme is central to our purpose. Although many 
post-modernist philosophers including Richard Rorty define the post modern world 
view as an anti-epistemological project, we concur with Linda Martln Alcoff ( 1996) 
that "Post-modernism i-; sti ll engaged in the work of conceptualizing knowledge and 
reality in some way recognizably continuous with the philosophical work that has gone 
before " (p. 4). The belief in the demise of epistemology is unwarranted. Post-
modernist thinking has brought about a paradigm shift, a shift from the old or classical 
epistemological problematic. but it still retains an account of knowing which is of 
course non-foundationalisr. It is an account that tends to be hermeneutical. Finally 
the general system theory prO\ ides the holistic approach which helps to justify the 
cognitive import of the ~h ift of thinking from the objectivist to the constructivist 
per spec ti ve. 
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Definition of Terms 
The attempt to blend different perspectives into a single theoretical articulation 
and to situate critical thinking within a broader conceptual framework entails semantic 
changes in the interpretation of old concepts . This section purports to prevent possible 
confusions that the assignment of new meanings to old concepts might create in the 
course of reading this paper In the context of our critical study, we use Ernesto 
Laclau 's (1994) concept of discourse. It is as follows: " ... we will call articulation 
any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified 
as a result of the articulatory practice . The structured totality resulting from the 
articulatory practice. we will call discourse. " (Laclau & Mouffe , 1994, p. 105). This 
definition includes much of Foucault 's interpretation of discourse but rejects his 
distinction between discursi"e and non-discursive practices. From our perspective, all 
institutional practices are discursive in nature. A discursive structure is a cognitive 
entity which constitutes and organizes its objects through its articulatory practice. In 
this respect, our view of discourse is almost equivalent to Wittgenstein's language 
game. Effective . integrative and complex thinking refer to the cognitive process 
known as creative and critical thinking. We make occasional uses of the latter terms 
to maintain the intelligibility of some passages, but fundamentally we interpret them as 
two interrelated facets of a single process. Effective, integrative and complex thinking 
are used interchangeably but effective and integrative are used more in 
contradistinction with analytical or reductionist thinking. The term complex thinking 
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emphasizes the interconnectedness of relational structures; it is employed as an 
alternative to "higher order thinking" which connote a hierarchical scheme. It is our 
contention that the hierarchical structure involved in the traditional construal of reality 
is a projection of our anthropocentric mode of thinking; there are actually no up and 
down that our discourse actually represents. Genuine integrative thinking is thinking 
in relational terms: it involve s no hierarchy. Another important term that recurs a few 
time is logocentrism. Pauline Marie Roseneau (1992) offers a very clear definition of 
logocentric thinking. '"Logocentric is an adjective used to describe systems of thought 
that claim legitimacy by reference to external universally truthful propositions. Post-
modernists are opposed to logocentric thought. They say such systems are really 
grounded in self-constituted logic . They consider them circular, self-referential and 
self-satisfying" (p. xii ). Finally. the exclusion of the category of truth from the 
conceptual structure of the the sis is a strategic choice. To maintain consistency or to 
avoid the objectivist implication it entails, we make use of "viability ," a constructivist 
concept that is closely related to Dewey's "warranted assertability." 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CO~YENTIO!\AL MODEL OF EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE 
AND PAUL'S CRITICISMS 
Epistemological Assumptions 
The conventional model of educational practice is predicated on an 
epistemological perspective within which knowledge is construed as a transcendent, 
determinate or objective entity independent of the knower. This conception which 
harks back to the formative years of the western philosophical tradition, derives its 
modern articulation from the thought of the French philosopher and mathematician 
Rene Descartes. It still remains the dominating assumption in the natural sciences and 
the guiding principle in much of current academic research, despite the storm of 
criticisms to which it has been subjected since the monumental work of the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant. In Learning and Teaching the Way of Knowing (1985) 
Elliot W. Eisner observes that "knowledge is considered by most in our culture as 
something that one discover~. not something that one makes. Knowledge is out there 
waiting to be found and the most useful tool for finding it is science." (p.32). The 
implication of this cognitive position. which is known in the philosophical literature as 
objectivist epistemology. is the ontological commitment according which the world is 
divided into two mutually exclusive realms: the phenomenal world of human 
experience and the realm of human cognition. On this view, the world is made up of 
discrete entities having definite properties or essences. Regardless of how it is 
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perceived. interpreted or recognized, it still remains what it is, a transdiscursive 
structure to be apprehended by human cognition. In his delineation of the objectivist 
principles, George Lakoff ( 1990) offers the following summary: 
Existence and facr are independent of belief, knowledge, perception, 
modes of understanding and every other aspect of human cognitive 
capacities. No true fact can depend upon people believing it, on their 
knowledge of it. or any other aspect of cognition. Existence can not 
depend in any way on human cognition (p. 64) . 
Based on this premise. knowledge comes to be equated with the outcome of the 
process of discovering. categorizing. and conceptualizing the facts contained in the 
objective world. The conceptual or theoretical construct resulting from this cognitive 
process is set forth as an objective account of reality, an account that is supposedly 
independent of the inquirer's point of view or frame of reference. Henry A. Giroux 's 
deconstructive analysi s of this perspective points out that 
Knowledge . like scientific inquiry , is regarded as value-free. Thus 
knowledge should be objective and described in neutral fashion. The 
assumption here is that knowledge can be reduced to those concepts and 
facts that exist a priori and then can be translated to operational 
definition s and precise meanings (Giroux , 1993, p. 177). 
Accordingly. the viability or explanatory power of the scheme in question depends on 
how accurately it corresponds to or captures the essence of the phenomenon observed. 
That, of course. has to do with the rigor with which the so-called neutral standards of 
rationality have been applied. For the objectivist doctrine , as alluded to earlier, holds 
that the world is a rational order and therefore all knowledge claims pertaining to that 
order can only be justified on the basis of rationally neutral standards of procedure . 
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The implication of the objectivist doctrine being delineated here is that the 
process of thinking is reduced to reasoning or the mere application of logical 
algorithms. Intuition. including the various modes of intellection expressed in the arts 
falls outside the bounds of cognition. The standards of objectivist rationality constitute 
the inquirer's exclusive tools. and the failure to meet them is bound to result in wild 
imaginings. not cognition. In other words, beyond the pale of logic, the mind 
dispenses altogether with cognition and flounders in the realm of pure fantasy. It is 
important to point out here that the objectivist mode of thinking helps explain the 
predominance of the analytic approach to events , the rigid striving for determinacy, 
and the uncompromising: quest for certainty that are characteristic of current academic 
research. 
The content of conventional school curricula and the attendant mode of 
educational evaluation strongly reflect this reified concept of knowledge that 
characterizes the objectivist perspective. School curricula consist, for the most part. of 
pre-packaged sets of unambiguous. non-negotiable materials designed by concerned 
authorities as the body of knowledge to be learned. Usually, this body of knowledge, 
which is meant to be free of cognitive dissonance, is fragmented into discrete parts 
and organized in sequential order within disciplinary boundaries. Each discipline 
represents a well-specified entity having no organic relations with others. The idea 
here is that knowledge is made up of discrete entities and is contained in texts and the 
problem of pedagogy. therefore, is a question of employing the methodological 
procedure that facilitates its transmission. So knowledge acquisition becomes a 
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process of accumulation. and the "amount" of knowledge acquired is coextensive with 
the amount of material covered. The pedagogical structure brought about by this 
objectivist conception of knowledge is one that replicates the simple, linear, and 
mechanical model of comm unication . It basically includes the so-called body of 
knowledge as the unambiguou s message to be transmitted to the students , the teacher 
as the agent transmitting thar body of knowledge and, of course, the student as the 
receiver. 
Teaching as Transmitting 
As knowledge is a ready-made structure , independent of the knower, the 
function of teaching becomes reduced to a mere mechanical process of transmission. 
It is this very practice that Paulo Freire refers to as the banking concept of education. 
The significance of the banking metaphor lies in the fact that, within the objectivist 
framework, students are viewed as receptacles into which knowledge gets deposited. 
This knowledge is expected to accumulate as more of it gets in. Educational 
evaluation. therefore . represents the process that helps withdraw the accumulated 
amount and gives the examiner a precise indication of the extent to which specified 
"units of knowledge '' have been grasped. It is important to note here that knowledge 
is evaluated in quantitative term s. That should not be surprising, for, to fulfill the 
objectivity requirement of the underpinning epistemology, knowledge must be dealt 
with as discrete units and transmitted as such. Thus the transmission of pre-designed 
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units of knowledge must be interpreted, if not as a logical consequence of the 
objectivist epistemology described above, at least as an implication thereof. Ann E. 
Benhoff ( 1986) puts the matter in a very succinct and elegant way: "Pedagogy always 
echoes epistemology: the way we teach reflects the conception we have of what 
knowledge is and does" (Berthoff. 1986, p . 11 ). Berthoffs statement touches one of 
the key points that the present study concerns itself with. The way one teaches is 
strongly determined by the conception of knowledge one holds and no significant 
change in the pedagogical process is to be expected without a modification in the 
underlying epistemological assumption. 
In the transmissi on model wherein knowledge is totally determined by 
competent authorities prior to the learning experience, pedagogy turns out to be a 
simple, unidirectional or mechanical process. It practically excludes all 
communicational interaction. The teacher's task is that of carrying out the content and 
the methodological procedure: sh e is not authorized to effect any significant changes. 
In fact , she is seen by man y in the higher rungs of the professional ladder as a 
specialized technician trained in the business of shaping youngsters' minds in 
conformity with dominant value s and norms. While she may occasionally use her 
ingenuity to rethink her methodological approach and thereby galvanize the spirit of 
the class, the content of learning and the learning procedures are not expected to vary 
a great deal. In short. the teacher has very little, if any , role in the decisions that 
deeply affect the students' life. From the above , it follows that the student has no 
choice but to ingest the certified data presented to her. Giroux 's comment summarizes 
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the whole point that is being made here. "Teachers and students within this context 
are expected to be either passive transmitters or consumers of knowledge, rather than 
negotiators of the world in which they work and act." (Giroux, 1983, p. 179). From 
this perspective. any attempt by the student to inquire into the body of knowledge 
presented to her constitutes a waste of time. It does so by virtue of the fact that the 
propositional content of this body of knowledge is taken to be an accurate 
representation of transcendent truths. As an incontrovertible given, it is immune to 
critical inquiry. Supposedly. the time spent in such a "futile exploration" would yield 
greater results if invested in more extensive coverage. 
Along with the sanctioned knowledge of which the student is a passive 
recipient. comes a set of algorithm s that she , at a given moment, applies mechanically 
to pre-set puzzles and at other times can enunciate very well without being able to 
apply. The result of that. a" it is well known, is that. once no longer involved in the 
particular situation requiring their use, the student often forgets them. That the student 
is denied participation in her own learning is further reflected in the way that her 
perspectives on particular issues are handled and in the content of the curricula as 
well. Her point-of-vie\A. or frame of reference plays no contributing role in the 
structuring of the learning experience. When occasionally articulated, it is greeted 
with a fair degree of courtesy but still held as an extraneous interference which is 
expected to have no deviating or shaping influence on the pre-structured linear process 
of teaching and learning. The importance of this exclusionary practice lies in the fact 
that what matters in the ernluative phase of the process is often. if not exclusively. the 
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pre-ordained bits of knowledge transmitted by the teacher, not the complex dynamics 
which emerges as a result of interactions. In other words, what the teacher teaches 
takes precedence over what the student learns and consequently what evaluation 
actually measures is the retentive capacity of the student's memory. 
The instructional content of school curricula makes the denial of the student's 
input an even more conspicuous fact. A cursory glance at the programs offered in 
many schools reveals that the abilities privileged by the school authority are almost 
exclusively those developed in the areas of the natural sciences , math , social studies 
and English . The development of artistic ability, seemingly, plays no part in the 
education of the child. An education is seen as devoid of vital social necessity and is 
therefore relegated to the margins of educational concerns. Yet, a surprising number 
of so-called under-achievers as well as academically advanced students are potential 
artists. They often exhibit incredible artistic talents which the schools fail to recognize 
as valuable social assets. As William Levi and R.A . Smith (1991) bluntly put it: 
"What counts in an acquisitive society like our own are prosperity and security; what 
counts much less are moral and spiritual values, education for wisdom , and, of course. 
aesthetic perception and artistic tastes" (p. 7). As a result, some students are frustrated 
because not onl y their performance levels fall below the minimum academic standards 
but also the inflexible pedagogical structure with which we are presently concerned 
inhibits the development of their artistic abilities. Levi 's and Smith's evaluation of the 
critical necessity of art education presents the arts as fulfillment of vital human needs , 
not playthings that one uses for recreational purpose. The line of thought articulated 
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in the study undertaken by both authors refers to the eclipse of the arts or the divorce 
of art and society as cultural barbarism. For, as they conceive it, art plays as 
important a social role as science: it is a mode of intellection that projects human 
experience in a way that falls outside the purview of the scientific domain. The 
authors go on to say that "An has much to teach us about both the cognition of reality 
and the appraisal of life and in both these areas its revelatory capabilities come 
powerfully into play '' (Levis & Smith. p. 22). 
Thinking as Reasoning 
One of the most widespread complaints of teachers against their students is that 
the latter do not want to think nowadays. In the schools' hallways, at workshops and 
other occasions the frustration really stands out: "Students refuse to think; all they 
want is quick answers." It is fair to say that while this blame may be justified on 
some important grounds. it. nevertheless, overlooks a very simple fact: thinking 
cannot occur in just any pedagogical environment. Although thinking is as natural as 
sleeping, walking. and speaking. it can also be restrained or stifled. Certainly no one 
would deliberately refrain from engaging in that mental activity: the biological 
function it fulfills makes it a necessity of life. It is important to remember that the 
thinking impulse is present and discernible at a very early age of human life. Young 
children display a passionate interest in exploring the world around them; they do so 
naturally: no coercion or threat is necessary. Their quest for knowledge and meaning 
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seems to be unquenchable. However. the trend begins to take the opposite course as 
some external factors interfere with it. In this case , our current pedagogical 
environment may be singled out as one such factor. For, it is a context wherein 
children, unfortunately. begin to develop the awareness that what they think has no 
relevance to their learning . They are given a set of rules that they must learn how to 
apply effectively: little if any time is devoted to reflection . Their failure to do so is 
the ground on which teachers usually justify their complaint. Is the failure to apply 
rules the real issue here') 
The commitment of the conventional method of teaching to the principles of 
the objectivist outlook reduces thinking to logical reasoning or skillful manipulation of 
the tools of inquiry. In a si ruarion in which the goal and means of inquiry are 
respectively pre-determined and specified, thinking is obviously reduced to its 
teleological and algorithmic dimensions. The effective application of logical canons to 
the propositional structures of ready-to-hand arguments or problem-solving is 
interpreted as the defining characteristic of thinking. The rigid and unidirectional 
process embedded in the pedagogy of transmission clearly instantiates this 
oversimplified view of thinking. The narrow space that is supposedly provided for 
thinking allows no deviation from the rules of logic and the student, placed in this 
context, is considered to be thinking when she demonstrates a certain ability in the 
application of the linear process of reasoning handed to her. Raymond S. Nickerson's 
( 1987) characterization of "good thinking" is a case in point: 
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My stereotype of a good thinker can be characteriz.ed in terms of 
knowledge , abilities , attitudes, and habitual ways of behaving. Here are 






uses evidence skillfully and impartially: 
organizes thoughts and articulates them concisely and coherently; 
distinguishes between logically valid and invalid inferences; 
suspends judgment in the absence of sufficient evidence to support a 
decision 
understands the difference between reasoning and rationalizing;... (p . 
29). 
Similar but more inclusive taxonomies of thinking skills are developed by 
experts in the field. Robert H. Ennis' is very relevant to the issue at hand, but it is 
unfortunatel y put aside due to space constraint. 
The fostering and development of those skills in the classroom situation are 
recognized here as an essential task of education. However, they are only parts of the 
rule-oriented aspect of thinking which is properly defined as logical reasoning. 
Logical thinking. in turn. is . fundamentally , a truth-seeking cognitive process, a 
process the exclusive emphasis of which is on accuracy of knowledge or objective 
certainty. Thinking as a whole is. however, a much more complex mental activity. It 
is irreducible to algorithmic procedures. It is perhaps almost impossible to specify 
what lies within its scope. Thomas H. Warren's (1994) clarification of the concepts of 
thinking and reasoning can be used to further illuminate the point. According to 
Warren , reasoning is a rule-oriented process which requires the application of the skills 
of rationality and calculation. It concerns itself with such rational and computational 
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procedures as quantitati ve analysis. argumentation, fallacy recognition , syllogistic 
reasoning. information-processing. and the like. It aims at knowing. Thinking, on the 
other hand, denotes a mental activity which transcends the realm of reasoning. It is a 
quest for meaning. Here is how he puts it in Rethinking Reason : 
Thinking ... is characterized essentially by reflection, "ponderment" or 
"feeling." Thinking involves the activity of ponderment and perplexity. 
Reasoning is bent on measuring, thinking is a quest for meaning. The 
impulse behind reasoning is "how-much?" and "does it follow?" the 
impulse behind thinking is "why?" and "what is the significance?" 
Reasoning counts: thinking contemplates (p. 222). 
This conceptual differentiation substantiates the point that is being argued in 
this section. It provides a clear line of demarcation between the two concepts and 
thereby brings the argument into a sharper focus. From the standpoint summarized 
above , it can hardly be said that the conventional model of educational practice has a 
real commitment to students· thinking. That's not to say, though, that the teacher, 
purposely. refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the students' voice. It is rather 
the overall practice in which she is engaged that inhibits the natural flow of thinking. 
After all , as stated earlier. both the teacher and the student are pawns in a game the 
rules of which they have no effective control over. 
Be it as it may. thinking, in the full meaning of the word, is to a large extent, 
non-existent in the traditional classroom environment. If all the student has to do is 
master the prescribed algorithms and apply them in an effective way, thinking cannot 
be said to be occurring nece ssarily. For, communicational interaction which is an 
instance of genuine thinking plays no part in the process. The student, somehow, ends 
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up realizing that she must remain ensconced in her own point of view or frame of 
reference while ingesting bits of fragmented data that have not been through any 
process of se ttlement or negotiation . When she is allowed to examine particular bits 
of information , all she can reall y engage in, as cognitive inquiry, is a logical 
assessment if. in fact. she possesses the rudiments of logical analysis at all. She 
cannot invest her whole se lf in it because she is not supposed to modify the "given," 
which is usually what thinking doe s. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PAUL'S CRITICISM AND ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
Paul's Criticism 
The deficiencies and detrimental impact associated with this transmission model 
of academic instruction are laid bare in Richard Paul's critical assessment of the 
situation. In hi s Critical Thinking (1990) Paul presents the transmission model of 
instruction as a crippling authoritarianism whereby the learner is trained to behave in 
mindless conformity with established norms. He explains the debilitating impact of 
the model in terms of the inte11ectual passivity and indifference it fosters through the 
"inculcation " of knowledge. In Paul's view the uncritical reception of pre-digested 
thoughts is inimical to learning. It is so , in the sense that it stunts the learner's 
reflective capacity and inquiring spirit. As a result, she becomes intellectually 
dependent. subservient to authority , and unable to critically interrogate and thwart 
oppressive social relation s. Here is how he puts it: 
Our present process of raising children and teaching them has, in my 
judgment. this unhappy effect. Children come to adulthood today as 
intellectual, emotional , and moral cripples. They are not whole or free 
persons ... they may have learned to effect an adult veneer, how to put 
on socially accepted masks: at root, however, infantile, egocentric 
identification and commitments rule them. They do not know how to 
conduct a serious discussion of their own most fundamental beliefs ... 
they have learned to avoid "understanding" (p. 98). 
Paul is addressing here a very serious issue. He is referring to an educational 
practice which promotes su bm issi veness, narrow-mindedness, and emotional insecurity. 
rather than creating the environment that is truly conducive to self-directed learning, 
20 
intellectual development and emotional maturity. The inference to be drawn under the 
circumstance is simply that the current educational institution fails to carry out its 
most fundamental task. since it is creating the very problem that it is supposedly 
designed to solve. 
A faulty conception of knowledge and learning is what Paul believes to lie at 
the root of the problem. He points to the disembodied view of knowledge involved in 
current pedagogical practice as a key factor. The detachment of knowledge from the 
thinking that generates it. he argues, not only strips it of its very essence, but also 
breeds an exclusionary mode of thinking which he terms monological thinking . By 
that he means the convergent mode of thinking which requires one true answer to a 
question , one possible so lution to a problem, and that takes place in one frame of 
reference. As Paul contends. it is that approach to knowledge and thinking that leads 
some people into believing that knowledge is a determinate object that can 
mechanically be transmitted from one individual to another, and that learning simply 
consists in ingesting that knowledge. That, in his view, constitutes the shaping force 
of didactic instruction. as he i~ wont to call it. 
An educational process that is truly emancipatory is, from Paul's perspective, 
one that enables the student to transcend the natural inclination toward monological 
thinking. Monological thinking, he asserts, perpetuates mental states that are rationally 
ill-grounded and therefore antithetical to the advancement of knowledge and learning. 
People typically presuppose their points of view to be the truth. This 
uncritical closed-mindedness perpetuates prejudices. Individuals are not 
inclined to examine and question their own biases, unless they develop 
critical insights into them. Neither are they inclined to consider whether 
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another's point of view is more accurate or insightful than their own. 
We must help students discover that no single point of view contains all 
the truth, that no single perspective is without limitations and 
weaknesses ... It is our responsibilities as teachers to design activities 
and assignments that directly facilitate this end (Paul, p. 267-268). 
It is important to emphasize here that Paul's understanding of effective thinking 
is situated in a broader perspective than the mere overcoming of egocentric tendency. 
It includes a determined intellectual effort on the pan of the thinker to transcend 
academic and cultural boundaries as well. As far as his analysis is concerned, self-
contained academic disciplines foster prejudice by interpreting reality within their 
particular frames of reference. He points out that "to the extent that a human problem 
is rendered technical. it is reduced to a relatively narrow system of exclusionary ideas. 
Specialized disciplines develop by generating ever more specialized subdisciplines 
abstracting further and further. from the "wholeness" of things" (Paul, p. 94). The 
same is true , he argues. of culturally specific interpretations of reality. They emanate 
from a set of experiences that are limited by particular socio-historical , political and 
geographical contexts and are therefore inherently biased. So, an essential task of 
education is to enable student to reconstitute the fragmented "whole" through 
multidisciplinary and multicultural thinking. In the conceptual framework laid out by 
Paul. this mode of thinking is supposedly a non-algorithmic, non-procedural one. It is 
a macro-integrative process of cognition based on a multi-perspectival approach to 
reality. In his critical thinking model that we are about to scrutinize, he refers to it as 
multilogical thinking . 
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Paul' s Alternative Model 
Knowing as constructing 
A conceptual shift from knowing as discovering to knowing as constructing is 
posited in Paul' s critical thinking model as a necessary condition for the restructuring 
of the educational proce ss . The shift, as explained in the model , must not be 
interpreted as an arbitrary choice but rather as a responsible cognitive act meeting the 
imperative of the knowing process as it unfolds in actuality. It draws attention to the 
fact that knowledge . contrary to what it is made out to be in the standard paradigm of 
educational practice. is the outcome of collaborative intellectual effort, not something 
that antecede s human inquiry. 
Paul illu strates hi s cognitive position in the following statement: 
The world is not gi ven to us sliced up into logical categories, and there 
is not one. but an indefinite number of ways to "divide" it, that is, 
experience. perce ive. or think about the world, and no "detached" point 
of vie w from the supreme perspective of which we can decide on the 
appropriate taxonomy for the multiple realities of our lives. Conceptual 
schemes create logic al domains and, it is human thought, not nature that 
create s them (p 4 17 ). 
As the product of hum an thinking . conceptual schemes are conditioned by the 
perceptual field s from which they emanate and the state of knowledge by which 
perception is shaped. So knowledge belongs in the category of those conceptual 
structures which mu st undergo constant revision and correction as new possibilities 
arise and the field of hum an perception widens. When applied to educational theory 
and practice , knowledge. thus construed, is to be approached not as a finished product 
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available for consumption, but as propositions or a set of data to be problematized. In 
Paul's theoretical scheme, this set of data retains the status of knowledge only for 
those who have participated in its creation. To the student, it is but a springboard for 
the critical learning process. It simply serves as a basis on which the student learns 
how to learn or how to construct knowledge. Simply put 
knowledge is not to be confused with beliefs nor with those things, like 
printed texts or spoken lectures which represent knowledge ... A book 
contains knowledge only in a derivative sense, only because minds can 
analytically and thoughtfully read it, and only through that active critical 
process, and only thu s. gain knowledge (Paul, p. xi). 
If the factual information presented to students is to stimulate thinking and not to be 
uncritically absorbed. then a learning environment radically different from the 
transmission model is necessary. according to Paul. The pedagogical process must be 
structured in a dialogical context wherein differing and conflicting points of view get 
to be articulated and explored in an interactive manner. 
Dialogue as the \1ethodological Setting for Real Learning and Knowing 
The social nature and provisional status of knowledge make dialogue the 
appropriate setting for its acquisition, justification, and revision in Paul's conceptual 
framework . In the dialogical context, the teacher is no longer the transmitter of 
knowledge and the student. the receptacle. By means of the materials at hand and her 
teaching strategies. the teacher sets the stage for the learning/knowing process to 
unfold. She is a facilitator. The point here is that students become actively engaged 
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in their own learning because the dialogical process of inquiry brings their thinking 
into play . That is the context for authentic learning, as far as Paul's model indicates. 
Here is how Paul conceives it "In general , students learn best in dialogical situations, 
in circumstances in which they must continually express their views to others and try 
to fit others' views into their own" (Paul , p. 246). In the same line of thought, he 
claims that "only when students have a rich diet of dialogical and dialectical thought, 
do they become prepared for the messy , multidimensional real world, where 
opposition, conflict. critique are everywhere. Only through a rigorous exposure to 
dialogical and dialectical thinking. do students develop intellectually fit minds" (Paul, 
p. 248). The dialectical component here is to be understood as the mode of thinking 
that is required when it comes to testing the strengths and weaknesses of opposing 
points of view. It is disciplined thinking that calls for the application of the standards 
of reasoning and the tools of logical analysis. It involves identifying assumptions, 
assessing evidence. tracing implications and the like. 
On Paul's view the significance of dialogical inquiry lies in its generative 
power and its capability to help overcome egocentric and sociocentric thinking. 
Dialogue. he points out, has the potential to generate much more learning than 
conceived in the teacher's lesson plan. When different points of view are expressed, 
dimensions of particular issues that were hitherto unseen come to light. As a 
consequence, the process comes to assume a multidirectional character since each 
point of view is valued and integrated in the whole. The cognitive import of such a 
dynamic interaction is that students become aware of the complexity and 
25 
multidimensionality of issues. the limitations of their individual points of view and 
therefore the importance of a multiperspectival approach to reality or issues. Such 
awareness, it must be noted. plays a central role in Paul's dialogical setting. It is the 
basis on which intellectual efforts can be made by committed individuals to transcend 
their egocentric and sociocentric thinking. He formulates his point in the following 
terms: 
Children must experience dialogical thinking because such thinking is 
essential for rationally approaching the most significant and pervasive 
everyday human problems. and without it they will not develop the 
intellectual tools essential for confronting their own instinctual 
egocentric thought (Paul, p. 214). 
He goes on to argue thar 
If egocentricity and sociocentricity fby egocentricity and sociocentricity 
Paul means respectively the tendency to view everything exclusively in 
relationship to oneself and one's own social group] are the disease, self-
awareness is the cure ... the solution then is to reflect on our reasoning 
and behavior: to make our assumptions explicit and critique them ... ; to 
listen carefully and open mindedly to those with whom we disagree ... 
therefore the development of students awareness of their egocentric and 
socio-centric patterns of thought is a crucial part of education in critical 
thinking (Paul. p. 310). 
Strong Sense Critical Thinking 
Paul bases his critical thinking model on the assumption that the human mind 
exhibits that innate tendency to think in a non-reflective and non-rational manner. In 
other words , metacognitive thinking develops as a targeted end within the context of a 
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formal educational process: it is not a proclivity of the human mind. He puts it this 
way : 
It is certainly of the nature of the human mind to think - spontaneously, 
continuously. and pervasively - but it is not of the nature of the human 
mind to think critically about the standards and principles guiding its 
spontaneous thought. It has no built-in drive to question its innate 
tendency to believe what it wants to believe ... the human mind 
spontaneously experiences itself as in tune with reality ... It takes a 
special intervening process to produce the kind of self-criticalness that 
enables the mind to effectively and constructively question its own 
creations (Paul. p. 30). 
What then is Paul 's conceptualization of that intervening process to which he 
refers as critical thinking? 
Critical thinking is disciplined , self-directed thinking which exemplifies 
the perfections appropriate to a particular mode or domain of thinking. 
It comes in two forms. If the thinking is disciplined to serve the 
interests of a particular individual or group, to the exclusion of other 
relevant persons or groups. I call it sophistic or weak sense critical 
thinking. If the thinking is disciplined to take into account the interests 
of diverse persons or groups. I call it fair-minded or strong sense critical 
thinking (Paul. p. 33 ). 
Paul 's concept of critical thinking is used in contradistinction with two other 
types of thinking: uncritical thinking and the sophistic critical thinking mentioned 
above. Uncritical thinking is thinking that ignores rational, logical and epistemological 
demands in favor of its egocentric interests. Sophistic critical thinking, on the other 
hand, is thinking that meets intellectual standards but that is used in a self-serving 
way. Strong sense critical thinking , as featured in the model proposed by Paul , 
includes the following : the perfections of thought, the elements of thought, and the 
domain of thoughts. The category of perfections of thoughts refers to the skillful 
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applications of intellectual standards in the assessment and settlement of issues. 
Below is a list of those standards on which the contrasting characteristics are included: 
clarity vs unclarity 
precision vs imprecision 
specificity vs vagueness 
accuracy vs inaccuracy 
relevance vs irrelevance 
consistency vs inconsistency 
logicalness vs illogicalness 
depth vs superficiality 
completeness vs incompleteness 
significance vs triviality 
fairness vs bias or one-sidedness 
adequacy vs inadequacy 
While the use of those canons has a great importance in the critical thinking 
process, it is nevertheless insufficient. It must be joined and strengthened by the 
ability to bring the following elements of thought into play. 
1) The problem or question at issue. 
2) The purpose and goal of the thinking. 
3) The frame of reference and points of view involved. 
4) Assumptions made. 
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5) Central concepts and ideas involved. 
6) Principles and theories used. 
7) Evidence, data. or reasons advanced. 
8) Interpretations and claims made. 
9) Inferences, reasoning and lines of formulated thought 
10) Implications and consequences involved. 
The command of these elements of thought, in turn, has a great deal to do with 
the thinker's ability to relate her thinking to particular domains of thoughts or different 
conceptual frameworks. Thi s ability, Paul emphasizes, is a sine qua non for the 
achievement of the perfections of thought. However, Paul believes that strong sense 
critical thinking involves much more than the cognitive dimensions delineated above. 
He argues that "good thinking". as he often refers to effective thinking , exhibits 
conformity to very specific intellectual virtues. He lists seven of them, under the 
heading of traits of mind. 
a. Intellectual humility: Awareness of the limits of one's own knowledge, 
including sensitivity to circumstances in which one's egocentrism is 
likely to function self-deceptively; sensitivity to bias and prejudice, and 
limitations of one's view point. 
b. Intellectual courage: The willingness to face and assess fairly ideas, 
beliefs , or viewpoints to which we have not given a serious hearing, 
regardless of our strong negative reactions to them. 
c. Intellectual empathy: Recognizing the need to imaginatively put oneself 
in the place of others to genuinely understand them. 
d. Intellectual Integrity: Recognition of the need to be true to one's own 
thinking , to be consistent in the intellectual standard one applies, to hold 
one 's self to the same rigorous standards of evidence and proof to which 
one holds one's antagonists. 
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e. Intellectual perseverance: Willingness to pursue intellectual insights and 
truths despite difficulties, obstacles, and frustrations. 
f. Faith in Reason: Confidence that in the long run one's own higher 
interests and those of human kind at large will be served best by giving 
the freest play to reason ... 
g. Intellectual Sense of Justice: Willingness to entertain all viewpoints 
sympathetically and to assess them with the same intellectual standards, 
without reference to one's own feelings or vested interests ... 
So. from Paul 's theoretical standpoint, it is the systematic integration of the 
cognitive dimensions and these traits of mind in the process of thinking that 
exemplifies genuine critical thinking. Otherwise, it is but an incomplete, defective, or 
disembodied mental operation . As Paul clearly states it "the mere conscious will to do 
good does not remove the prejudices which shape our perceptions or eliminate the on-
going drive to form them . To minimize our egocentric drives we must develop critical 
thinking skills in a special direction. We need, not only intellectual skills, but 
intellectual character as well." (Paul. p. 55). 
From the above, then. it follows that critical thinking is a complex mode of 
thinking that is metacognitive. recursive, self-correcting and ethical. It is 
metacognitive by virtue of the fact that it reflects on its own assumptions, implications 
and consequences: it is recursive in the sense that it is self-generating in its constant 
turn upon itself and; it is self-correcting because it judges its strengths and weaknesses 
in relation to other perspectives and finally ; it is ethical because of the intellectual 
virtues it integrates. 
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Critical Thinking as a Rational Quest for Knowledge and Truth 
Paul construes strong sense critical thinking not only on the basis of the 
intellectual virtues embedded in it, but also in terms of its epistemological import and 
its logical potency. Genuine knowledge and objective truth are pointed as central 
concerns of his critical thinking model. To substantiate the point, it is important to 
take a closer look at the theoretical scheme he proposes and draw a line of 
demarcation between the two different but intimately related dimensions of which it 
consists . 
Paul's Strong Sense Critical Thinking, it must be remembered, exhibits the 
intermingling of two kinds of intellectual process: the one that concerns itself with 
effectiveness in the application of rational standards and which he categorizes as 
intellectual ability, and the other that brings into play a certain number of intellectual 
virtues and to which he refers as intellectual character. Intellectual ability is that 
category within which fall the perfections, the elements and the domains of thought 
mentioned earlier. Paul' s reference to these structural components of critical thinking 
is made strictly in epistemological and logical terms. In his quest for the cultivation 
of rational passions, he specifies that 
A passionate drive for clarity, accuracy, and fair mindedness, a fervor 
for getting to the bottom of things, to the deepest roots of issues, for 
listening sympathetically to opposition points of view, a compelling 
drive to seek out evidence. an intensive aversion to contradiction, ... 
inconsistent application of standards, a devotion to truth as against self-
interest - these are the essential commitments of the rational person 
(Paul , p. 218). 
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Paul stresses the significance of these commitments by pointing out that "virtually all 
the progress made in science and human knowledge testifies to this power [the power 
of reason]. and so the reasonability of having confidence in reason ... " (Paul, p. 319). 
By definition , clarity, accuracy , consistency, and relevance are but logical categories. 
They are criteria employed in the assessment of arguments. The achievement of valid, 
reliable or genuine knowledge is usually the ultimate goal of the mode of inquiry 
exhibiting rigor in its employment of rational procedures. In his emphasis on what he 
means by the rational thinker. he explains that "by it [rational] we do not simply mean 
a general skill in the use of reason to serve our interests ... [We] have in mind those 
who in some sense are committed to fair-mindedness, who have made a moral 
commitment to developing reason in the service of truth .... " (Paul, p. 133). Paul's 
insistence upon the significance of the generative power of dialogical inquiry serves as 
an evidential warrant for this quest for knowledge and truth. As explained earlier, the 
dialogical process requires that participants "step out" of their frames of references and 
enter points of view that differ and/or conflict with their own. The point of that, of 
course, is far from being an exercise in role-playing for its own sake. The 
crisscrossing of frames of reference fulfills a very important epistemological purpose. 
It is a validating process: it helps to ascertain the cognitive accountability of 
perspectives. It does so by allowing participants to become aware of dimensions of a 
particular issue that were previously unseen. In other words, this integrative process 
of learning which Paul terms multilogical thinking supposedly produces less distorted, 
more reliable "truths" and knowledge than the ones achieved in the monological 
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framework. In Paul's conceptual framework , they are genuine knowledge and truths 
because the participants have actively engaged in their construction. 
Paul' s Theoretical Contributions to Critical Thinking 
The strong-sense approach to critical thinking constitutes a very important 
contribution to the theoretical development of the field. Until the work of Richard 
Paul , the main concerns of critical thinking theorizing were skills acquisition and 
competencies development. A cursory glance at the relevant literature reveals that 
none of the other leading critical thinking theorists ever thought of integrating an 
ethical perspective in their theoretical accounts . They construed critical thinking 
almost exclusively in logical terms. When they translated it into a pedagogical praxis, 
the focus was on the implementation of methodological strategies that would help 
enhance cognitive flex ibility and intellectual ability. Kerry S. Walters observes that 
Most orthodox theoretical accounts of critical thinking argue that the 
ultimate function of good thinking (and by implication, the primary goal 
of thinking skills instruction) is to distinguish between justified and 
unjustified claims or beliefs. This is done by applying the rules and 
techniques of formal and informal logic to propositional expressions in 
order to determine if their statements are true and their arguments valid 
or sound (Walters, p. 6-7). 
Such well-known theorists as Harvey Siegel and Robert H. Ennis are leading 
proponents of this logicist conception of critical thinking. Their reductionist approach 
has been the object of intense critical debates (Walters, 1994). 
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Paul's strong-sense critical thinking is a reconceptualization of the field that 
attempts to problematize the logicist perspective and lay bare the empty formalism and 
the strong objectivism associated with it. Its insistence on the necessity for a 
multilogical approach to issues has far-reaching implications. It decenters the linear 
and analytical view of inquiry and privileges a multiperspectival and integrative one. 
This can be explained on the ground that both analysis and synthesis are joined 
together in an interactive process that creates a dynamic equilibrium as a particular 
issue is explored from different standpoints. What results from the interaction is a 
recursive pattern, not a linear one. This recursive pattern, it must be noted, serves to 
justify Paul's view according to which genuine thinking is metacognitive and self-
correcting. Obviousl y. with the assumption that self-reflection is an iterative process 
that follows a circular path. the linear conception becomes untenable. 
The implication of this cognitive position is that critical thinking is a 
constructive as well as a se lf-deconstructive mental activity . Through the dynamic 
interaction of differing "iewpoints, the limitations of a single perspective get revealed 
and the relational character of thought asserts itself. This awareness, in turn, brings 
into play a host of cognitive operations which include the reversal, displacement and 
restructuring of a particu Jar thought orientation. Another important outcome of Paul's 
model is related to the concept of understanding. If in the conventional model of 
inquiry understanding is the apprehension of objective reality, in Paul's theoretical 
scheme, it takes on a radicall y different meaning. Paul does not construe 
understanding as something that is achieved as the result of what Peter Elbow 
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derogatorily calls a "distancing technique." It is rather an interpretation that emerges 
from the interplay of intersubjective acts, or to use Gadamer's metaphor, from a 
"fusion of horizons.·· In other words, understanding is seen as an hermeneutic act that 
comes out of empathic sensitivity. 
From the above it follows that Paul's model concerns itself with more than just 
the enhancement of intellectual ability. As Paul emphatically points out, intellectual 
ability does not necessarily imply intellectual virtue; cognitive ability alone can be 
easily used in a se lf- serving way. This is where the traits of mind championed by 
Paul comes into play. The critical thinker in the strong sense is not simply someone 
who can marshal an argument. identify assumptions and use evidence in an effective 
way; she has moral responsibilities as well. Beside the application of intellectual 
tools, moral considerations play an important role in her critical judgments and actions. 
That is what Paul means by strong sense critical thinking and also what places the 
model in sharp contrast with the conventional conceptions. This model represents a 
radical departure from other accounts of critical thinking because it calls for the 
integration of a dimension which was far removed from the concerns of schools' 
curricula. It is fair to say that Paul turns critical thinking into a humane intellective 
process as opposed to the more aggressive one implied in the models that emphasized 
the enhancement of intellectual skills and competencies to the detriment of intellectual 
virtues. As a morally responsible citizen, Paul's critical thinker recognizes that 
efficiency is not the sole determinant of the choice she has to make. A deep moral 
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commitment to the well-being of others must also be an important part of her 
decision-making. 
The Limitations of Paul 's Strong-Sense Critical Thinking 
Despite its illuminating insights, Paul's construal of critical thinking is marked 
by some serious limitations. One of its main weaknesses is that it exemplifies the 
very didactic approach that it sets out to displace. A critical examination of Paul's 
theoretical model reveals that much of what seems to represent a departure from 
conventional critical thinking theorizing constitutes, indeed, a set of unsubstantiated 
claims which resonate more like fragments of a rhetorical discourse than statements 
enunciating an adequately worked out theoretical construct. To be sure, Paul assigns 
very precise meaning to his terms. but that alone proves inadequate as far as a 
theoretical work is concerned. The elucidation of the foundational concepts within the 
context of their relational structure, is to a large extent, lacking in his model. It is not 
quite clear how Paul relates his dialogical world view to his conception of dialectical, 
and multilogical thinking. What is the importance of dialectical thinking in a 
multilogical context? What is the relationship between multilogical thinking and 
dialogical thinking? How does Paul reconcile the cognitive or epistemological closure 
involved in dialectical thinking with the open-ended process of dialogue or with his 
constructivist epistemology? And finally, how much latitude does the passion for 
accuracy, consistency. and precision championed by Paul leave for the thinker's 
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creative imagination? Those are important issues which Paul's account of critical 
thinking fails to address. One is inclined to think that this failure stems, to a large 
extent, from Paul's deep involvement in his didactic mode of presentation. 
Another limitation characterizing Paul's model has to do with the underpinning 
epistemological assumption . Paul posits a constructivist view of knowing without 
delineating the epistemological principles thereof. His way of handling the issue gives 
the impression that constructivism refers to just one single cognitive position. He 
makes clear, in many of the repetitious passages of his books that knowledge is 
construction without. however. specifying the particular brand of constructivism to 
which he adheres. His statements in some parts of his work imply that he subscribes 
to radical constructivism. For instance in his criticism of the theory of knowledge 
underlying conventional pedagogy he states that "each learner creates knowledge" 
(Paul , 24 ). In other areas. however, he seems to shift his epistemological orientation 
to social constructivism . The following is an illustrative example. 
We must remember that knowledge , however extensive, is a highly 
limited social construction out of an infinitude of possible such 
constructions. Although all humans live in a veritable sea of potentially 
expressible truths , they express only a few of them, only a few become 
knowledge (Paul. 29) . 
The problem here is that radical constructivism and social constructivism are based on 
very different premises regarding the construction of knowledge. One holds that each 
individual constructs her own knowledge (radical constructivism), the other maintains 
that knowledge is a social construction (social constructivism). In addition, people's 
cognitive structures are construed differently by different versions of constructivism . 
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For instance, while the Chomskyan version interprets cognitive structures as innate, the 
Piagetan one presents them as products of developmental construction. The essential 
point here is that while Piaget and Chomsky are both constructivists, they hold, 
however, radically different epistemological assumptions. One must bear in mind also 
that the positions have their respective pedagogical implications, and that attempts to 
integrate both in a given theoretical perspective or educational theory would require 
careful analytical consideration. The gist of the argument here is that the mere 
reference to knowledge as construction is not ipso facto an adequate specification of 
an epistemological orientation . It is also necessary to provide a detailed account of the 
orientation in question and establish the logical ground thereof. 
A third problem associated with Paul's model includes an overemphasis on 
rationality and an uncritical use of the concept of rationality itself. The overemphasis 
on rationality reveals a lingering commitment to the logicist and objectivist approach 
to thinking which leads the model to vitiate its own possibilities. Paul construes 
knowing, critical thinking or critical dialogue as open-ended processes. This 
conception is in fine tune with his constructivist epistemology. However, he urges the 
genuine critical thinker to have truth as her priority. How could one have truth as 
priority in an inquiry without being committed to some form of objectivism? Besides, 
objectivism entails logicism: the objectivist world view has logical thinking as its 
attendant mode of inquiry. which is, in no way identical to critical thinking. At issue 
here, is the fact that Paul posits a constructivist epistemology as the underpinning 
philosophy of his critical thinking model, and at the same time, develops an argument 
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which not only contradicts hi s philosophical assumptions but also thwarts the 
potentiality of his model. The fact here is not that the cognitive value of rational 
thought is being denied. We are emphasizing that passion for rationality is fueled by a 
belief in objective truth and objective knowledge. Usually thinkers who subscribe to 
such a belief favor analytical thinking as their mode of inquiry. Analytical thinking 
may be needed in some instance s, but it cannot prevail in the context of critical 
dialogue which is supposed to be an open-ended process. Analytical thinking is 
teleological , exclusionary. and reductionist by nature. Cognitive closure is where it 
leads to. Walters argues that "logicism 's tendency to totalization encourages a thinking 
style that can give rise to unreasonably aggressive or adversarial spirit" (p. 11). If that 
is true, then Paul 's overall argument is self-contradictory; it implicitly advocates a 
mode of thinking which invalidates his notions of fair-mindedness, and empathic 
sensitivity. 
Paul 's conception of critical thinking remains firmly entrenched in the logicist 
tradition. The passion for rationality and the rigorous application of algorithmic 
procedures it advocates are not necessary characteristics of critical thinking. Some 
particular pieces of work may be highly regarded or praised for the ingenuity and fine 
artistry they exhibit but still remain utterly challenging due to their ambiguous 
character. Usually, it is the ambiguity involved in the thought process they incorporate 
that makes them attractive and long-lasting. In Philosophy of Education (1995) , Nell 
Noddings makes the following remark regarding Paul's conceptualization of critical 
thinking. It is worth quoting at length: 
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Paul contrasts the product of critical thinking to faulty thinking in a list 
of dichotomies: clear versus unclear, precise versus imprecise, specific 
versus vague , accurate versus inaccurate ... fair versus biased. As critics 
have pointed out. however, no one of these is necessarily an attribute of 
critical thinking. A product may be accurate, for example, and still be 
the product of rote learning. On the other side, a powerful example of 
critical thinking ( so judged by experts) may contain inaccuracies:. 
Further, not all critical thinking is characterized by precision, specificity , 
or even plausibility. And judgements such as relevance and significance 
might depend more on the field of application than on the reasoning 
itself (Noddings. p. 86). 
In addition , empirical evidence proves Paul's championing of his conception of 
rationality totally unjustified . Paul's uncritical acceptance of the Enlightement's 
intellectual investment in rationality seems to ignore the undesirable outcomes. If the 
Enlightement has achieved anything significant it is definitely not its conception and 
application of rationality. It is hard to imagine how such a rationally prone 
civilization like the West could have been the one to author the two 20th century 
world wars , the Holocaust in Germany and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
It is extremely difficult to understand why the rational men of the west do not see it 
irrational to spend billions on deadly weapons and to engage in productive activities 
that threaten the ecosystem of which they are part. If rationality is relevant to critical 
thinking (we are still convinced that it is) , it has to be reconceptualiz.ed or construed in 
term s that go beyond Paul's traditional usage. 
The overriding importance Paul attaches to rationality may well be the reason 
why he omits creative thinking in his critical thinking theorizing. For many critical 
theorists tend to view creative and critical thinking as two opposite mental processes 
and dismiss the former as irrational. While it would be unfair to situate Paul in that 
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category of theorists -- because he claims not to be therein -- it is still important to 
point out that creative thinking represents only a very small parenthetical remark in hi s 
whole theoretical scheme. Only two paragraphs on pages 219-220 are devoted to 
creative thinking. The bulk of the work consists mainly of a set of detailed statements 
without much justification. 
The omission of creative thinking makes his strong-sense critical thinking an 
incomplete theoretical model. For creative and critical thinking are two different 
aspects of the same reality. It is impossible for a critical thinker not to be creative at 
the same time. The creative mind is always at play whenever the critical thinker is 
marshalling evidence . and identifying assumptions to evaluate statements. One of the 
two may prevail in some context or for some purpose, but they always evolve in a 
dynamic and intimate interrelationship. As Matthew Lipman puts it "We must accept 
the fact that there is no such thing as pure critical thinking or pure creative thinking. 
There is just thinking. and higher order thinking is the order that blends the critical 
and the creative ." (Lipman. 1992. p. 154 ). In a similar vein, Delores Gallo in 
Educating for Empathv, Reason and Imagination (1994) contends that "the common 
polarizing differentiation made between critical thinking and creative thinking is 
deceptive , since it often leads one to see creative thinking as the discrete opposite of 
rational thought. It minimizes the contribution of necessary evaluative convergent, 
critical processes to effective creative production and similarly obscures the import of 
the speculative, divergent. imaginative processes to effective critical thought" (Gallo, 
p. 47). This is the wealth of analytical insight that Paul's model lacks by excluding 
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creative thinking from the theorizing process. After all, the passion for rationality, 
accuracy, and precision, as Paul advocates, may have an inhibiting effect on creativity . 
A balance between rational rigor and creative imagination is necessary. This necessity 
can be recognized. however. if analytical attention is given to both . That is what 
Paul's model fails to take into account. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF AUTHENTIC CRITICAL THINKING 
The theoretical perspective that is being presented in this chapter starts with the 
assumption that a critical thinking theorizing that truly commits itself to open-
mindedness must be based on an open epistemological discourse. By open 
epistemological discourse is meant a view of cognition that dispenses with objectivist 
mind-sets and posits knowledge. reality and rationality as discursive conventions. One 
can quickly notice that this view of cognition is also a version of constructivist 
epistemology. It differs. however. from mainstream constructivism in the sense that it 
attempts to deconstruct and supplant the old dichotomies thought/reality, 
internal/external , creative thinking/critical thinking , subject/object characterizing 
modernist philosophical theories. In other words, it seeks to effect a reversal of the 
old epistemological problematic by integrating the insights of the post-modern theory 
of cognition. 
Knowledge , reality and rationality are discursive conventions because they 
acquire meaning and can be apprehended only within particular discursive formations. 
It is impossible to imagine their existence outside any discursive field. Discourse 
creates the objects that it talks about, be it the knowledge and meaning that it 
articulates or the regulatory principles that are used to inquire into them. They are all 
discursive entities , and therefore have no transcendental existence. Ernesto Laclau and 
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Chantal Mouffe , in He~emony and Socialist Strate~y (1994) subscribe to a similar 
position: 
Our analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-
discursive practices . It affirms: a) that every object is constituted as an 
object of discourse , in so far as no object is given outside every 
discursive condition of emergence b) that any distinction between what 
are usually called the linguistic and behavioral aspects of social practice, 
is either an incorrect distinction or ought to find its place as a 
differentiation within the social production of meaning, which is 
structured under the form of discursive totalities (p. 107). 
What is being stated here is not that discourse creates the physico-chemical 
phenomena that occur in the world but rather that it makes statements about the 
observation and experience of those phenomena. The statements usually undergo 
revision , modification and change depending on what further observation and 
experience yield or reveal. They are temporary judgments which constitute our 
knowledge. our truth. and our reality. Laclau's and Mouffe 's clarification is crucial 
here: 
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has 
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with 
the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick 
is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and 
now , independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects 
is constructed in terms of natural phenomena or 'expression of the wrath 
of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is 
denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather 
different assertions that they could constitute themselves as objects 
outside any discursive condition of emergence (Laclau and Mouffe, p. 
108). 
The tendency to construe knowledge as representation of reality stems from a 
misunderstanding of our discursive practices and their relationship to the phenomenal 
world of human experience. It helps perpetuate a false dichotomy between a world 
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standing outside of our inquiry practice and a discourse that mirrors that world. The 
problem with that dichotomy is that it tends to give rise to a number of irreconcilable 
theoretical schemes constituting themselves as theoretical enclaves or self-enclosed 
worlds with very rigid or impenetrable boundaries. That the dichotomy is false can be 
explained on the ground that both knowledge and reality are theoretical constructs or 
conceptual entities created through our communicational interactions. At first, that 
may sound absurd or even offensive to scholars with a strong realist persuasion, but a 
careful reflection will reveal that when we refer to either knowledge or reality we are 
dealing with a conceptual structure. If we admit that there exist no transdiscursi ve 
concepts or structures, and that concepts or structures are what we use to impose 
meaning on our observation and experiences, then light will shine through. To clarify 
our epistemological conviction further and to demarcate it from mainstream 
constructivism , it is important to report a passage that Walter Truett Anderson has 
quoted from a book: 
Heinz von Foerster says: "Out there there is no light and no color, 
there are only electromagnetic waves; "out there' there is no sound and 
no music, there are only periodic variations of the air pressure; out there 
there is no heat and no cold, there are only moving molecules with 
more or less mean kinetic energy, and so on. 
von Foerster thus crisply states the constructivist point that the meaning of the 
things we experience is created out of the raw materials from "out there. But, 
others inquire , don 't we also create the raw material? Aren't electro-magnetic 
waves, air pressure, kinetic energy also constructs? And since we are admitting 
that anything we say about "out there" is a construct, don't we create out 
there? ... (Anderson. p. 76). 
Anderson's report constitutes a clear summary of the conception of knowledge that is 
being defended in this paper. It shows, very succinctly, how the post-modern view of 
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knowledge , the one to which we subscribe here, collapses the boundary between the 
"internal" and "external" worlds. 
The same argument holds when it comes to dealing with rationality. We tend 
to think of rationality as though it is a "given". With this tendency, we create a world 
of illusion in which rationality becomes the transcendental judge of our knowledge 
claims and actions. In this world, reason and only reason gets to pronounce the last 
verdict because. it is supposedly neutral or impartial. This belief in the absolute 
authority of reason leads many scholars to dismiss any critique of reason as a barbaric 
enterprise. In Educating Reason: Rationality. Critical Thinking and Education (1988), 
Harvey Siegel criticizes such deconstructionists as Henry A. Giroux and Derrida for 
advocating a model of rationality that is incompatible with the ideal of critical 
thinking. A critical reading of their works reveals, however, that what they in fact do , 
is not disparage reason altogether. but rather dethrone it from its conventional 
ontological status and reintegrate it into the discursive matrix whence it emanates. 
From the constructivist perspective advanced in this paper, our standards of 
rationality are also situated in discourse. We find no algorithms, no methods of 
procedures, no accuracy. no consistency in nature. By means of discourse or through 
our dialogical interactions. we create these devices that we use to assess and evaluate 
our knowledge claims. To project them as a "neutral matrix" or an "Archimedean 
point" on which we stand to support or refute our hypothetical statements is to indulge 
in wishful thinking , for those standards are also subject to reevaluation and revision. 
We can only use standards of rationality to evaluate standards of rationality. We have 
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no alternative to the circular or recursive process of knowing how we know. In The 
Tree of Knowled~e (1987). Maturana's and Varela's opinion is that "Maybe one of the 
reasons why we avoid tapping the roots of our knowledge is that it gives a slightly 
dizzy sensation to the circularity involved in using the instrument of analysis to 
analyze the instrument of analysis. It is like asking an eye to see itself." (Maturana 
and Varela p. 24). 
From the foregoing it follows that the model of rationality defended in this 
study turns the traditional quest for epistemic certainty into a futile intellectual 
preoccupation. In fact. the issue of certainty versus uncertainty is devoid of any 
epistemic import within the theoretical perspective we are trying to articulate here. It 
stems from a foundationali st epistemology which the present study dismisses as 
inimical to the conception of inquiry as an open-ended process. The search for 
certainty is predicated on the belief in ultimate essence and foundation. As such, it 
points the way toward the elimination of inquiry. In a conceptual scheme wherein 
knowledge is construed as a structural dynamics and reality as a process, the goal of 
inquiry is hardl y the attainment of certainty, for there are no determinate objects or 
entities to be apprehended . Even the notion of an approximation to such objects turns 
out to be a vacuous one. The notion of approximation applies insofar as entities or 
objects are extra-discursive and have definite configurations. But in a context wherein 
whatever is grasped can only be defined in discursive terms, the notion comes to lose 
its meaning. The history of science is punctuated with examples defying such a 
notion. It was once believed that atom was the smallest indivisible particle of matter. 
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That belief remained somewhat unquestionable for quite some time until later 
discoveries came to prove it unwarranted. What seems to be the case here is that 
entities are products of conceptual categorization and therefore are not preontologically 
given: they have no meaning outside the structure of discourse; they are cognitive 
constructions. The same argument can be used to challenge the notion of uncertainty 
that is so prominent in current critical theories. To be uncertain about the validity of 
a particular theoretical scheme or knowledge-claim is to believe in an underlying 
substrate with which the theoretical scheme or knowledge-claim in question has an 
independent relation. In other words , it is to believe in a foundation or essence of 
reality. For, epistemological skepticism is an offspring of philosophical 
foundationalism and essentialism. In Embracing Contraries (1986), Peter Elbow 
argues that 
Epistemologically, doubting reflects the trial-by-fire foundation of 
knowledge whereby we feel no position should be accepted until it has 
withstood the battering of our best skeptics. Believing reflects the 
consensus foundation of knowledge whereby we feel that no position 
should be accepted until a respected group of authority positively 
endorses it through participation in it (Peter Elbow, p. 266). 
So, both certainty and uncertainty fundamentally reflect the same foundationalist 
conception of knowledge: they simply differ in the methodological approaches to 
which they give rise. From this vantage point, the quest for coherence would seem to 
be more consistent with epistemic openness than that of uncertainty or the skeptical 
attitude toward knowledge-claims. 
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Toward an Integrated Model of Critical Thinking 
The construal of knowledge and reality as relational structures constituted by 
discourse gives rise to a way of thinking the focus of which is on relations as opposed 
to objects. This way of thinking displaces the traditional practice of breaking down 
configurations into independently observable components and explains things rather 
through their interrelation or in terms of their context. Since it explores patterns or 
structures in their interconnectedness, it is irreducible to analytical thinking, for 
analytical thinking deals with static configurations. Analysis is essentially a 
fragmentating process which arrests the dynamic flow of events by isolating them from 
their meaningful contexts. Thinking in terms of relations is contextual thinking; it is 
often referred to as "systemic " or holistic thinking. Its focus is on the integrated 
"whole" . The emphasis on the "whole" does not mean however, that analytical 
thinking is totally eclipsed. Analysis still remains an integral part of the process; but 
it simply plays a complementary role. The overall process, is still integrative, and 
therefore non-reductionist. 
The integrative approach puts forth here deals with creative and critical 
thinking as two mutually interdependent dimensions of the same complex cognitive 
process. It argues that there is no effective thinking that is not simultaneously creative 
and critical. The reference to a particular piece of thinking as either creative or critical 
has to do with what the underlying process emphasizes and/or the vantage point from 
which it is looked at. Marx 's Capital can be viewed either as a piece of creative or 
49 
critical work depending on the purpose for which it is used. If the emphasis is on 
how his theoretical perspective came about, then it will be seen as a highly creative 
piece of work. If, on the other hand, the work is being looked at from the standpoint 
of the methodological rigor embedded in it, then it will be viewed as a highly critical 
piece of work. The point here is that any piece of creative work the mind brings forth 
involves some sort of critical awareness. There are some rational choices made in the 
creative process that brings it about. That is what makes it significant in the first 
place. The same argument holds for a critical work. Part of its success is due to the 
critic's use of his imagination in tracing implications, marshalling evidence and 
drawing conclusions. In his Thinking and Education ( 1992), Matthew Lipman 
advocates a similar conception of creative and critical thinking. He argues that 
" ... there is no creative thinking that is not shot through with critical judgments, just as 
there is no critical judgment that is not shot through with creative judgments. We can, 
of course , construct abstract ideal types in which pure forms of thinking are delineated, 
but in actuality admixture is the rule" (Lipman, 194 ). While many scholars contrast 
critical thinking with creative thinking in terms of criteria usage, Lipman's view is 
more in tune with the theoretical orientation of the study undertaken here. He reasons 
as follows: 
Here I am compelled to acknowledge that, even as ideal types, critical 
and creative thinking may not be mutually exclusive. Take the question 
of sensitivity to context. Both types of thinking manifest this feature; 
the only difference is that in creative thinking it is predominant, 
whereas in critical thinking it is, although still essential, of somewhat 
lesser importance. Is it not possible, then, that both critical and creative 
thinking may be criterion-guided but that this is a matter of greater 
importance in critical thinking than in creative thinking? (Lipman, 206). 
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Another way to explain the complementarity of critical and creative thinking is 
through the interaction of the uses of algorithms and heuristics in the process. As 
critical thinking is criterion-governed, it fulfills a regulatory function in creative 
thinking; and as creative thinking is heuristically oriented, it tends to make critical 
thinking more flexible . 
The emphasis on relational structures as the concern of effective thinking 
explains cognitive skills. competencies and evaluative criteria in terms of the organic 
structure of which they are parts. It contributes to the specification of a model of 
thinking which involves no hierarchical schemes. It helps to reveal the fact that no 
matter how simple a particular cognitive skill may be, it is still as significant as any 
other ones in the network of relations within which it is integrated. Its being a 
precondition for the acquisition of a more complex one does necessarily relegate it to 
the bottom of a pyramid of skills as it is the case in Bloom's Taxonomy. It is always 
important to keep in mind that knowing or learning evolves in a circular fashion; it 
goes from simple steps to more complex ones. It is not a linear process that goes 
from bottom to top. From this standpoint, "complex thinking" is conceptually a more 
accurate way to refer to the model that we are presently delineating than the "higher-
order thinking" currently in use . Although complex thinking is part of Richard Paul's 
and Matthew Lipman 's conceptual frameworks, the term "higher-order thinking" is 
used as well. This reveals a certain inconsistency in their conceptual structures and a 
reluctance on their parts to dispense with the tendency of construing objects or 
relationships in hierarchical terms. 
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The idea that knowing or learning evolves in a complex and circular fashion 
reveals the self-transcending feature of the integrative mode of thinking under study. 
As thinking integrates, it also dissociates itself from its object to examine its own 
process. In other words. it reflects not only on its content but also on its 
methodology. It is this self-awareness, this self-reflectiveness or this ability to 
transcend itself that accounts for much of the criticalness in genuine critical thinking 
and it is also what differentiates it from analytical thinking. So when we refer to 
"effective thinking " as being integrative, we do not wish to use the term in an ordinary 
sense; we view it instead as the result of an iterative process of combination and 
dissociation. What this recursive pattern of combination and dissociation suggests or 
implies, is that effective thinking is simultaneously constructive, deconstructive, and 
reconstructive. It is constructive in the sense that it operates across a multiplicity of 
frames of reference and seeks to integrate as many perspectives or insights as possible 
when the focus happens to be on arguments or theoretical perspectives having a 
common referential point. In areas of investigation like science and medicine, it works 
across disciplinary boundaries or specialized fields and explore the interconnectedness 
of structures within structures or sy sterns within sy sterns. Physics, chemistry and 
biology become a broad field of investigation within which relationships are explored 
and meanings are made. Medicine dispenses with its practice of dealing with organs 
as isolated objects and considers the organism as a meaningfully structured whole. 
The deconstructive dimension comes into play as the same integrative process must 
decenter privileged sets of relations, displace hierarchical oppositions, or even 
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undermine the conceptual infrastructure of a particular theoretical edifice depending on 
the depth, scope and purpose of the inquiry involved. 
The deconstructive approach is an integral part of the model being proposed 
here. It recommends a shift of emphasis from the center to the margins of thought 
configurations. This recommendation is justified on the ground that points of view, 
worldviews, or conceptual schemes are individuated through a process of exclusion 
and marginalization . Through a process of strategic exclusion, they establish 
themselves as privileged centers and relegate to the margin all that is perceived to be 
irrelevant. The ensuing hierarchical scheme presents itself as selfsame identity or a 
unified frame of reference. It is what in the deconstructive perspective is known as 
logocentric thinking. Such a thinking attempts to achieve certainty through the 
mastery of cognitive dissonance. 
The margins or boundaries of conceptual schemes become the logical site of 
effective thinking . The focu s on the marginal or the excluded enables the thinker to 
reestablish the differential relations that logocentric thinking represses. It reveals the 
fact that center and margin. inside and outside are mutually constitutive. In so doing , 
it provides the ground for the redrawing of boundaries through the deconstructive 
reversal and displacement of hierarchical oppositions. In this respect, the works of 
Michel Foucault constitute one of the most representative illustrations. Be it in The 
Archeology of Knowledge ( 1972), The Birth of the Clinic (1975), Discipline and 
Punish (1979) , The Order of Things (1973), The History of Sexuality (1980), the focus 
of Foucault 's attention is fundamentally on the marginal or the excluded. Through his 
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reconfiguration of the western intellectual landscape, Foucault not only grants 
legitimacy to the marginalized element but also confers upon it a strong discursive 
voice. 
An important implication of the argument advanced in this paper is that 
meaning or understanding is one of the central goals of critical thinking. The 
dispensation with the conventional epistemological problematic eschews any 
commitment to truth as a viable goal of critical inquiry. Truth, as traditionally 
conceived fits only within the conceptual framework of the objectivist paradigm 
wherein epistemic certainty is attainable and knowledge is associated with truth. In 
Percepts. Concepts. and Theoretic Knowled~e (1973) , Harold Lee points out that: 
Truth is not a fundamental category of epistemology. Knowledge is the 
fundamental category. but knowledge is not to be defined in terms of 
truth. Knowledge is relative to the evidence, and in empirical matters, 
the evidence is never all in. Thus knowledge is fallible and does not 
rest on truth. (Lee. p. 242). 
Lee goes on to say that " .. truth applies only to what fits within some particular 
categorical scheme: and this is why truth is not a fundamental category of 
epistemology" (Lee, 243 ). Lee's point is well taken here because our critical thinking 
theorizing allows inquiry into a particular conceptual structure to yield different 
understandings or interpretations. If different interpretations of the same reality can be 
valid, then what one really achieves, as a result of inquiry, is properly defined as 
meaning, not truth. The problem with the traditional conception of truth is that it is 
associated with a reductionist mode of thinking which construes validity in 
exclusionary terms. It operates with a binary logic according to which something 
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either is or is not the case. Another way to put it is that there can only be one correct 
interpretation of a given phenomenon. This objectivist conception of truth, as alluded 
to earlier, is inimical to effective thinking. It sets different interpretive schemes into 
an adversarial relationship and therefore stunts the possibility for a constructive 
dialogue. The point here is that the end of critical thinking is critical judgment, and 
judgment is not truth. Judgments are evaluations based on evidence. Evidence, in 
turn . is conditioned by the interpretive scheme that makes it relevant and the point of 
view underlying the interpretive framework used. This mutual determination of 
interpretation and evidence not only makes the quest for meaning the actual end of 
critical inquiry but al so welcomes a polysemic view of reality -- that is the acceptance 
of more than one viable interpretation, or the plausibility of different perspectives on a 
particular issue. 
Pedagogical Implications 
The recognition that knowledge and reality are discursive constructs and that 
effective thinking aim s at understanding makes dialogue the authentic setting for 
critical inquiry. Of course . the choice of dialogue here as the appropriate methodology 
for critical inquiry is not a novel idea. Many critical thinking theorists recognize 
dialogue as the proper methodological approach. What differentiates our dialogical 
perspective from some others such as the one proposed by Richard Paul , is that the 
one endorsed here stems from an open epistemological discourse and a view of critical 
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inquiry as an open integrative process. Paul champions dialogue, and openness but 
remains somewhat ensconced in a closed epistemological framework and operates with 
an uncritical conception of rationality. He fails to realize that participants in a 
"dialogue" will hardly integrate differing and/or conflicting points of view in their 
inquiries if they are convinced that rationality is an unquestionable authority in the 
construction of meaning. The uncritical acceptance of rationality entails an 
exclusionary logic which makes the very idea of dialogue a vacuous rhetorical 
discourse. 
Our constructivist epistemology gives way to a dialogical perspective with no 
authority at the center. It assigns authoritative finality to no one and to nothing. 
Teacher, instructional materials, students , including the rational norms to be used in 
the inquiry process play equal roles. The conception of authority that lends itself to 
our dialogical perspective is the one applied in the deconstructive mode of thinking. 
The deconstructive approach displaces instantial authority into functional authority. In 
other words , authority is viewed as a function, not as an instance. Michael Ryan, in 
Marxism and Deconstruction ( 1989), points out that "the move from instance to 
function in analysis also entails a move from absolutes to differential situational 
relations" (Ryan, p. 40-41 ). This deconstructive displacement of authority is of crucial 
importance to dialogue. It has democratic implications which, if taken seriously into 
account, will contribute to make dialogical inquiry a truly collaborative undertaking. 
As we mentioned earlier. the belief in an ultimate determinant, or in instantial 
authority contributes to the perpetuation of the traditional hierarchical scheme of 
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relations. In a hierarchical order, priority is accorded to the highest instance or to the 
view of the highest instance. In any way it is looked at, the question of priority or 
instantial authority is expected to act as a deterrent to genuine dialogue. Take, for 
instance, the authority of the text or the unquestionable authority of the knowledge that 
is believed to be contained therein. If participants must hold a reverential attitude 
toward that authority, they have to belittle the importance of any contributions that 
they would make. As a consequence, the absorption of "discrete units of ready-made 
knowledge becomes the rule. As a corollary, no dialogue is possible and therefore no 
real learning takes place. The same consequence is produced when it is the authority 
of the teacher that prevails. In the case of algorithmic procedures, the pedagogical 
practice turns into an empty formalism which distracts attention away from the 
substance of the text and from the participants' experiential fields. 
The dialogical process requires empathic sensitivity on the part of the 
participants. Careful listening and empathic understanding are two of the sine qua non 
of dialogue. For, dialogue is not a casual exchange of views among participants. It 
calls for the questioning of the deep-seated assumptions upon which the views are 
based. David Bohm (1996) explains that "Dialogue is really aimed at going into the 
whole thought process and changing the way the thought process occurs collectively. 
We have not really paid much attention to thought as a process. We have engaged in 
thought, but have only paid attention to the content, not to the process" (Bohm, p, 9). 
That is an important constructivist statement. Constructivist thinking investigates not 
only thought content, but thought process as well. Investigation in this case is not to 
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be understood as mere observation; it is the cognitive operation leading to the 
deconstructive displacement and reconfiguration of thought patterns. At this point it is 
important to contrast dialogue with debate. Dialogue is an integrative process. All 
participants contribute and learn. What emerges from dialogue is shared meaning, as 
Bohm is wont to say. Debate is an adversarial situation in which a particular view 
will prevail at the expense of the other ones involved. It is an exclusionary process. 
What we call dialogue in academia and in other intellectual circles is often a refined 
type of debate in which participants pretend to be real listeners. In reality, however, 
few of them listen: the majority remains ensconced in their frames of reference, 
practicing, on the surface , a sterile form of pluralism. To be sure, debate, like analysis 
still retains a certain importance inquiry , but when used exclusively it is not very 
effective in terms of settling judgments. It is an exclusionary practice operating with 
what Elbow refers to as the "distancing technique." 
Dialogue sets the ground for the interactions through which the fundamental 
questions of reflective inquiry are learned and knowledge is created. None of the 
points of view involved in a dialogical process contains knowledge. Knowledge 
resides in or constitutes itself through the interactions of points of view. It is 
relational , dialogical. and therefore ceases to exist outside the dialogical context. In 
Contemporary Literary Theory, G. Douglas Atkins quotes Shoshana Felman as saying 
that: 
The position of alterity is therefore indispensable. Knowledge is what is 
already there , but always in the other, knowledge, in other words, is not a 
substance but a structural dynamic; it is not contained by any individual but 
comes about out of the mutual apprenticeship between two partially 
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unconscious speeches which both say more than they know. Dialogue is thus 
the radical condition of learning and of knowledge, the analytically constitutive 
condition through which ignorance becomes structurally informative; 
knowledge is essentially, irreducibly dialogic (p. 16). 
A significant part of the knowledge created through the inter-change is the awareness 
that one's frame of reference contains only a fragment of a larger, more complex 
relational web. This awareness, in turn , plays a pivotal role in the development of 
critical thinking skills and dispositions. It serves as a rationale, a motivating force for 
a persistent exploratory attitude which includes self-reflection, reflection across frames 
of reference, and reflection across disciplinary boundaries. The willingness to defend 
or attempt to validate positions that differ from and/or conflict with one's own is no 
mere theatrical game. It requires a deep empathic sensitivity which is but a temporary 
repression of the ego. Through repeated practices of role-taking, participants learn the 
types of critical questions to ask. and when and how to ask them. They also learn 
how to cope with the issues of relevance , consistency, coherence, and 
comprehensiveness. In other words, they learn how to learn while learning a particular 
content, content being an interpretive scheme, a hypothesis, an argument, a story or a 
controversial issue. Dialogue enables those who partake in it to realiz.e that learning is 
exploration and change, to repeat Gregory Bateson's phrase. Another way to put it is 
that dialogue not only empowers the learner to construct, deconstruct and reconstruct 
knowledge and reality , but it also makes her aware that she does so . 
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The Goals of Critical Inquiry 
The emergence of self-awareness through empathic role-taking is an important 
cognitive step in dialogical inquiry. Not only does it set the ground for the 
enhancement of effective communicational interaction, it is also an essential pre-
condition for the attainment of self-transcendence. Self-awareness is to be understood 
here not as the knowledge of the existence of the self, -- since this is already a 
defining characteristic of humans - but instead as the knowledge that the self is an 
entity individuated through self-reflective communication. In The Tree of Knowled~e 
(1992) H.R. Maturana and F. Varela make the following statement: 
... Language as a phenomenon takes place in the recursion of linguistic 
interactions-- linguistic coordinations of linguistic coordinations of 
actions ... and language appears to an observer as a domain of 
descriptions of descriptions ... With language also arises the observer as 
a language entity: by operating with language with other observers, this 
entity generates the self and its circumstances as linguistic distinctions 
of its participation in a linguistic domain (Maturana & Varela, p . 211). 
Although we have generated objects including our "selves" through what the authors 
refer to as "social coupling ". we tend to forget this fact and consider them instead as 
fixed categories having a pre-linguistic existence. We continue to deal with the world 
in this fragmented way and think we can achieve deeper understanding and objective 
certainty through further fragmentation. Frijof Capra, a staunch advocate of systemic 
thinking, believes that ''Out of ignorance (avidya), we divide the perceived world into 
separate objects that we see as firm and permanent, but which are really transient and 
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ever-changing. Trying to cling to our rigid categories instead of realizing the fluidity 
of life, we are bound to experience frustration after frustration (Capra, p. 294-295). 
As we keep distancing ourselves from one another and from the world that we 
bring forth through self-reflective communication we entrap ourselves in an 
individualistic and foundationalist conception of knowing which legitimizes and 
perpetuates hierarchical oppositions, adversity, and aggressiveness. We cling to 
analysis as our dominant mode of inquiry whereby we maintain this outmoded 
epistemological outlook. The peculiarity of analytical thinking, it must always be kept 
in mind, is to dissociate. atomize and exclude. It often leads to a multitude of self-
enclosed worlds leaving debate as the only possible mode of communicational 
interaction. 
Creative and critical dialogue is a way out of this highly compartmentalized 
world. If individualist thinking gives us the analytical tools with which we have 
fragmented the world, collaborative thinking provides the cement with which to piece 
the fragments back together . Creative and critical dialogue is collaborative thinking. 
It helps bridge the intellectual cleavage by reintegrating the fragmented selves into the 
complex network of dynamic processes wherein they belong. The fragmented selves 
in question become critically aware of themselves as parts of a meaningfully integrated 
network of relations as opposed to pre-ontologically determined self-contained entities. 
Such a recognition is fundamental to epistemic openness and self-transcendence. It 
leads to a constant reshaping of perception and a shift in thinking which eclipses the 
linear pattern of thought. It does so by turning dialogical inquiry into a really 
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recursive, open-ended process of understanding and meaning-making. The recursive 
process integrates both the rational and the intuitive selves and maintains them in a 
balanced and dynamic interrelationship involving the following cognitive operations: 
dissociation/integration 
anal ysis/synthesis 
critical thinking/creative thinking 
self-assertion/self-transcendence 
In his call for a shift from the mechanistic to the integrative mode of thinking , 
Fritjof Capra (1996) espouses a similar line of argument. He draws attention to the 
consequence of our habitual pattern of thought which he characterizes as mechanistic 
and reductionist and contrasts it with the implications of the alternative perspective. 
Below is a table in which Capra brings the two modes of thinking into contrast and 
specifies the set of value s associated with each: 
Thinking Values 
Self-assertive Integ ra tive Self-Assertive Integration 
Rational Intuitive Expansion Conservation 
Analysis Synthesis Competition Cooperation 
Reductionist Holistic Quantity Quality 
Linear Non-linear Domination Partnership 
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This table encapsulates much of the argument of this section. To a large extent, it 
serves as a delineation of the conceptual framework underlying the critical thinking 
model that we are presenting in this paper. The first and the third rows synthesize our 
prominent way of thinking and the values that it entails. As shown, our mechanistic 
way of thinking tends to privilege the rational over the intuitive self. It construes 
relationships in linear term s and relegates the nonlinear to an inferior or unmanageable 
plane. This construal emphasizes analysis as the dominant mode of examination and 
therefore fosters and promotes a reductionist approach to cognition. As the table 
indicates, this mode of thinking is not value-neutral. It entails a set of institutional 
practices that legitimate our aggressive behavior. Expansion, competition, quantity and 
domination take precedence over conservation, cooperation, quality and partnership. 
Capra aptly points out that much of the exploitative and antiecological behavior we 
exhibit through our social structures, political systems, and technological approaches is 
rooted in our mechanistic way of thinking. Imperialism , patriarchy and the pollution 
of the environment, he contends, are prototypes of a mode of thinking that values self-
assertion over integration . Though Capra's analysis interrogates our habitual pattern of 
thought and calls for a shift from self-assertion to integration, it does not disparage the 
firmly entrenched tendency that it calls into question. What it recommends is a 
"dynamic balance between the two. Capra's position is definitely consonant with the 
perspective that is being developed here; its quest for integration is the underlying 
principle of the critical thinking model that is being worked out in this chapter. While 
we fully endorse it, there are three important points that need to be clarified: a) the 
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shift in thinking advocated by Capra is achievable in a context of dialogical 
interaction: b) the two modes of thinking evolve in a "trans-dialectical" relationship; c) 
integration implies self-transcendence as an ultimate cognitive ability. 
As implied in our model , change in perception and change in thinking do not 
occur in a vacuum. They grow out of critical self-awareness which, in turn, is the 
product of collaborative thinking or dialogical inquiry. Self-awareness implies the 
awareness of the "other": it is the result of a conscious reclaiming of the continuum 
from which the self has individuated itself. This conscious choice which implies a 
constant return to the source. brings about a non-reified concept of the self. In other 
words, dialogue makes self-awareness a cognitive possibility, and self-awareness, in 
turn, reshapes perception and thinking. This way, we end up with a non-hypostatized 
view of object and entity . 
Another strand of the argument is that while the shift in thinking results in a 
deconstructive displacement of the conventional reductionist mode of thinking, it does 
not necessarily integrate the two modes into a dialectical relationship. The mode of 
inquiry in which they interact transcends dialectical thinking. Dialectical thinking is a 
deterministic , predictable or teleogical process which follows a linear pattern, whereas 
the network thinking that characterizes our model leads to indeterminacy . That is why 
we refer to it as "trans-dialectical ". For, the process of integrative thinking often leads 
to unexpected results . It is impossible to specify in advance where the interaction is 
going to lead. To be sure , there are always some negotiations or judgements which 
find their applicability in concrete situations, be it in a political decision-making 
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process, in the formulation of an economic policy or in the implementation of an 
educational policy. However, judgements are to be taken as temporary settlements 
which further inquiry will supplant, displace, or revise. The whole thinking process 
however is endless! y recursive: it is not oriented toward a specific utilitarian end. 
Fundamentally , it is a biological necessity. 
The next point to be dealt with in this juncture has to do with the way our 
model construes integration. From our perspective, self-awareness is the cognitive 
base of genuine integrative thinking. That does not imply however, a direct causal 
relationship. Depending on the personality and personal history of a particular thinker, 
critical self-awareness may harden and develop into self-assertion and never reach the 
integrative phrase . Of course. self-assertion, is a normal outcome of effective thinking 
instruction , especially if the instruction in question embodies a pedagogical strategy 
aiming at counteracting a crippling educational practice. But strengthened to an 
exce ssive extent, as Capra cautions, self-assertion may constitute an obstacle to the 
integrative process of cognition. It may preclude the achievement of self-
transcendence , one of the ultimate goals of intellectual dialogue. Self-transcendence, 
as alluded to earlier, is the ability and disposition to go beyond one's point of view or 
frame of reference and explore and accept the validities of other perspectives. It is a 
sine qua non for a truly integrative approach to cognition. As one develop this ability 
and disposition , one reall y achieves the critical posture that is necessary for the 




As an open-ended, complex set of cognitive processes critical thinking is bound 
to elude any rigid conceptualization. Attempts to arrive at a phenomenological 
description must take into account a host of interrelated factors whose intricate 
interactions do not readily lend themselves to a static theoretical configuration. A 
process which emanates from and realizes itself through dialogue is expected to resist 
all definitional characterizations outside that context. Yet to be emphasized as part of 
an effective educational program, and to make inroads into established curricula, 
critical thinking must be discursively articulated and conceptually structured. This is 
essentially what Richard Paul's work is all about. Paul's model as we have seen, 
constitutes an important contribution to current scholarship on critical thinking. The 
ethical dimension it integrates opens a new track of investigation which helps broaden 
the subject's field of research. The blending of moral responsibilities and intellectual 
abilities in Paul's conception of critical thinking contributes to making his model a 
unique piece of scholarship. Until his work, ethical issues occupied only a marginal 
space in critical thinking theory. 
However, the model is not without its problems. For all its merit, it is fraught 
with a considerable number of contradictions, omissions and inconsistencies which 
diminish its explanatory power. It adopts a didactic style of argumentation which 
evades many of the theoretical claims made. It fails to establish the relationship 
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between critical thinking and creative thinking. Finally, it champions critical inquiry 
as an open-ended, multiperspectival process of cognition, but, at the same time, 
exhibits an uncompromising commitment to a logocentric view of rationality. In so 
doing, Paul 's model privileges the cultural imperative of analytical reductionism and 
constitutes itself, in part. as little more than a refined version of the conventional 
logicist conception of critical thinking. 
The perspective offered in this study as an alternative to Paul's view, provides a 
conceptual framework for the connection between the interpretation of critical inquiry 
as an open-ended process and the epistemological discourse that informs the 
interpretation in question. The main thrust of the argument proposed therein is that 
until critical thinking theorizing severes its link with the objectivist conception of 
rational inquiry. it will remain entrapped in a language game that contributes to the 
perpetuation of the very mind that it sets out to shake off. It will reinforce the long-
standing belief in the attainability of epistemic certainty and keep the inquiring subject 
detached from her object of inquiry. A way out of this intellectual tangle has been 
suggested. It consists in a radical shift from the objectivist paradigm and toward a 
critical appropriation of the theoretical groundwork laid by postmodernist thinking. 
The postmodern criticism of philosophical foundationalism paves the way to a truly 
integrative dialogical inquiry. It relinquishes the ideology of certainty which seriously 
constrains traditional investigation and turns epistemology into a productive, meaning 
making , hermeneutical process of cognition. 
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While the postmodern reconstruction of knowledge, meaning, rationality, and 
reality provides a conceptual framework that is conducive to an open perspective of 
critical thinking, it also has implications that must be taken into account. The 
decentering of the authority of the teacher and that of the text is among the most 
important consequences of the application of such a perspective. In this context, 
dialogue becomes a self-imposed medium, not something that thinkers are forced into. 
The teacher recognizes the necessity of renouncing her traditional role as a central 
figure to become a learner among many. However, that cannot be expected to occur 
as simply as it sounds. She must come with the right attitude and disposition. That 
pre-supposes a rethinking of the traditional program of teacher education whose over-
emphasis on methodological refinements and pedagogical prescriptions takes away 
much of what would really contribute to the intellectual empowerment of the teacher. 
She must be conversant with the dominant epistemological discourses, learning or 
educational theories if she is to be part of any positive educational changes or if she is 
to be a really transformative intellectual (to use Giroux's phrase). 
Another point to underscore here is that the cognitive approach taken in the 
project does not imply that cognitive change alone is all that is necessary for the 
restructuring of the educational process. Indeed, the functioning of the schools is 
intimately linked to a set of institutional power relations that are non-cognitive. It 
would be erroneous to think of the possibility of educational change independently of 
the power structure which shapes the educational status quo. 
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However, the fact that a structural change in the educational process requires a 
change in power relations that are non-cognitive does not warrant any passive attitude 
on the part of educators. At their levels, educators must do whatever is necessary to 
bring about the desirable educational outcome. That is the conviction out of which the 
integrative conception of critical thinking discussed in this paper grew. Educators 
must identify themselves as transformative agents, as active participants in the overall 
social process, not as passive transmitters of knowledge and values. 
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